in the period of the planned economy in china, administrative orders, instead of families and markets, allocated resources . thus the function of fgs was inhibited and state-owned enterprises acted as the basic economic units 傳統(tǒng)計劃經(jīng)濟中,行政命令取代了家庭、市場等基礎(chǔ)性資源配置方式,“家族基因”缺乏發(fā)揮作用的經(jīng)濟空間,形式單一的國有企業(yè)是計劃經(jīng)濟體制的基層單位。
in fact, the government only deputies people to enforce the ownership . so, in the viewpoint of modern enterprises theory, the essence of the state-owned-enterprise problem lied in, form the whole people ownership to the real run of basic economic unit, it must via a multi-layer proxy . and in each layer, the agents and the principals must have efficient regulation mechanism to warrant the target of the principals 因此,從現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論的角度看,國有企業(yè)問題的實質(zhì)在于,從全體人民行使所有權(quán)到每個基層企業(yè)的實際運行之間要經(jīng)過多層委托代理,每一層次的委托人與代理人之間都必須有有效的監(jiān)管機制來保證委托人的目標,這正是基于委托代理機制的西方企業(yè)理論與轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟中的國有企業(yè)問題的“接口”所在。
since the early 1980s, china has adopted economic reform policies that are market-oriented and reinstated the family as the basic economic unit . these policies have provided the opportunity for the infiltration of household deposits and human capital into state-owned businesses and the emergence of quasi-family 始于20世紀70年代末80年代初恢復(fù)家庭作為基本經(jīng)濟單元后的市場化改革,為民有資本和家族成員向國有經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域滲透提供了契機,使國有企業(yè)“準家族化”得以萌生。